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ARBITRATION

Supreme Court holds that any collective bargainingagreementwaiver
of an employee's right to litigate statutory employment discrimination
claims must be clear and unmistakable. Wright v. Universal Maritime
Serv. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391 (1998).
In November, the Supreme Court vacated a Fourth Circuit judgment
and held that for a union to waive employees' rights to a federal judicial
forum for statutory antidiscrimination claims, the agreement to arbitrate
such claims must be "clear and unmistakable." The Court did not address
the question of whether such a waiver would be enforceable.
Petitioner Ceasar Wright, a longshoreman, was subject to a collective
bargaining agreement ("CBA") which contained an arbitration clause. The
arbitration clause was very general and contained no explicit contractual
incorporation of statutory antidiscrimination requirements.
When
respondent Universal Maritime Service Corporation refused to employ him
following his settlement of a claim for permanent disability benefits for
job-related injuries, Wright filed suit, alleging discrimination in violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").
The District Court
dismissed the case without prejudice because Wright had failed to pursue
the arbitration procedure prescribed by the CBA. The Fourth Circuit
affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the
case, holding that the CBA's general arbitration clause did not require
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Wright to use the arbitration procedure for an alleged violation of the ADA.
The Court found that Wright's ADA claim was not subject to the
presumption of arbitrability under section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act ("LMRA"); matters beyond the specific terms of a contract
may be subject to arbitration as directed by the CBA, but they are not
presumed to be so. The Court assumed, without deciding, that an
employee's right to litigate statutory employment discrimination claims is
waivable in a CBA. However, the Court did not resolve the question of the
validity of a union-negotiated waiver of an employee's statutory rights to a
federal forum since no waiver occurred here. Even so, the Court held that
if such a waiver were to be enforceable, any such waiver must be clear and
unmistakable. In this case, a labor contract providing that its grievance
procedure is intended to cover all matters "affecting wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment" was not sufficiently explicit to
waive the petitioner's right to litigate his ADA claim, particularly in light
of the additional CBA language providing that "[a]nything not contained in
this Agreement shall not be construed as being part of this Agreement."

Labor and employment contracts held to be outside scope of FAA.
Craftv. Campbell Soup Co., 161 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 1998).
In a 2-1 per curiam decision, the Ninth Circuit held that labor and
employment contracts are outside the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"), and refused to compel an employee to arbitrate all aspects of his
grievance, including Title VII discrimination questions.
In Craft, a Campbell Soup employee filed a race discrimination suit
while his grievance under a CBA was still pending in arbitration. The
District Court ordered arbitration of the employee's supplemental state law
claims but ruled that Craft could not be compelled to arbitrate his Title VII
claim. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected the majority view among the
federal appellate courts that the FAA applies to all employment contracts,
with the exception of contracts for employees who work in interstate
commerce. The court read broadly an exclusion in section 1 of the FAA
for "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." It also
emphasized the limited reach of section 2, which provides for enforcement
of certain arbitration agreements.
In interpreting the relevant sections of the FAA, the Ninth Circuit
found the statute ambiguous and looked to the legislative history. Citing
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), the court reasoned that
Congress' commerce power at the time of the FAA's enactment in 1925
"was clearly limited to the actual interstate movement of goods." Although
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most courts have construed section l's narrow exclusion to apply only to
seamen, railroad workers, and similarly situated employees, the Ninth
Circuit said that such a construction relied on a contemporary
understanding of the statute, rather than one based on the time of
enactment.

Broad arbitration clause may constitute waiver of an employer's
statutory right to a judicial forum. Interstate Brands Corp. v. Bakery
Drivers & Baked Goods Vending Mach. Local No. 550, No. 98-7194, 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS 1162 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 1999).
Under a recent Second Circuit decision, employer Interstate Brands
must arbitrate its claim for damages caused by a union's alleged illegal
secondary boycott. The court held that a broad arbitration clause in a CBA
waives an employer's statutory right under the Labor Management
Relations Act ("LMRA") to adjudicate a secondary boycott damages claim
in a judicial forum. In so deciding, the court rejected the employer's
argument that the recent Supreme Court decision in Wright v. Universal
Maritime Service Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391 (1998), eliminated the presumption
of arbitrability with regard to disputes arising between parties to a CBA
that contains an arbitration clause.
Employer Interstate Brands Corporation ("IBC") had used nonunion
firms to distribute products for a number of years. In 1995, IBC acquired
Continental Baking Company ("CBC") and assumed the terms and
conditions of a contract between the union and CBC, which required in part
that the parties arbitrate "all complaints, disputes or grievances arising
between them involving questions of interpretation or application of any
clause or matter covered by this agreement, or any act or conduct or
relation between the parties thereto, directly or indirectly." The CBA also
excluded from arbitration certain disputes over changes in the employer's
distribution policies, including compensation or delivery methods. This
section provided for strike and lockout rights if the parties failed to agree
on proposed changes in distribution that IBC implemented.
Arguing that union-represented workers who already distributed
CBC's products were also entitled to distribute IBC's products, the union
claimed that IBC's use of nonunion firms to distribute products was a
change in distribution policy that did not require arbitration and could
trigger the right to strike. IBC's continued use of nonunion distributors
prompted the union to strike, and the company filed an unfair labor practice
charge alleging a secondary boycott in violation of the National Labor
Relations Act. IBC then brought suit under section 303 of the LMRA for
damages caused by the union's allegedly unlawful secondary activity,
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arguing that the recent Supreme Court decision in Wright had eliminated
the presumption of arbitrability for disputes under a CBA. In Wright, the
Supreme Court held that a longshoreman could bring his ADA claim in
court, notwithstanding a collective bargaining agreement's arbitration
clause. The Court held that a union-negotiated waiver of an employee's
statutory right to a judicial forum will not be given effect unless the waiver
is "clear and unmistakable." Rejecting IBC's argument, the Second Circuit
held that the strict standard of Wright does not apply when an employer
waives its own rights in an individually-negotiated contract with a union.
Since the contract's arbitration language is unusually broad and covers the
employer's section 303 claim, the court concluded that IBC had waived its
right to a judicial forum.

Arbitration award in conflict with an earlierNLRB ruling must cede
to NLRB decision. T. Equip. Corp. v. Massachusetts Laborers' Dist.
Council,No. 98-1148, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 641 (1st Cir. Jan. 15, 1999).
The First Circuit has held that an arbitration award that disagrees with
an earlier National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") ruling in a
jurisdictional dispute must give way to the NLRB ruling. The court upheld
the NLRB's award of construction work to employees represented by the
United Brotherhood of Carpenters, rejecting a labor arbitrator's award of
"pay-in-lieu of work' to employees represented by the Laborers
International Union.
After a dispute arose over the assignment of construction work, the
NLRB conducted a jurisdictional dispute resolution hearing under section
10(k) of the Labor Management Relations Act, awarding the disputed work
to the Carpenters. Less than a week later, the arbitrator held the contractors
in breach of contract and awarded "pay-in-lieu of work" to the Laborers.
Although the arbitration award involved damages, and not the work itself,
the First Circuit concluded that the two awards were irreconcilable.
Although case law clearly suggests that an arbitration award must
cede to a section 10(k) decision where the two conflict, the circuits are not
in agreement as to what constitutes such a conflict. The First Circuit chose
to follow a line of cases holding that a section 10(k) determination
awarding work to one union will conflict with an arbitration award favoring
the other union-regardless of whether the award constitutes damages or
work assignment. Two additional factors the court considered were that
the NLRB's section 10(k) decision preceded the arbitration award and that
requiring the employer to pay damages would penalize the company for
settling a jurisdictional dispute by complying with a section 10(k) decision.
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Arbitrator'ssubpoenafor documents from nonsignatory to collective
bargainingagreement is enforceable in federal court. American Fed'n of
Television and Radio Artists v. WJBK-TV, 164 F.3d 1004 (6th Cir. 1999).
In a case of first impression at the appellate level, the Sixth Circuit
held that a labor arbitrator's subpoena directed to a nonsignatory to a
collective bargaining agreement is enforceable in federal district court
pursuant to section 301 of the LMRA. The court limited its holding to
subpoenas compelling production of documents, as opposed to subpoenas
compelling testimony.
The employee, a television news anchor who was fired for alleged
misuse of automobile privileges, filed a grievance alleging that other media
personalities guilty of similar acts had been neither disciplined nor
discharged. After the employee unsuccessfully attempted to subpoena the
records of an automobile rental company, the arbitrator issued a subpoena
directing the company to produce records concerning use of its vehicles by
other media personalities. The company refused to comply with the
subpoena, and the employee sought enforcement. The district court found
that it had subject matter jurisdiction and authority to enforce the subpoena
under section 301 of the LMRA, but the court declined to enforce the
subpoena.
The Sixth Circuit upheld the District Court ruling with regard to
subject matter jurisdiction. The court found that the Federal Arbitration
Act does not create any independent federal question jurisdiction, but that
where the agreement to arbitrate is part of a collective bargaining
agreement governed by the LMRA, "the agreement to arbitrate itself arises
under federal law." Ordering the District Court to enter judgment
compelling production, the Sixth Circuit said the issue was not whether the
auto rental company could be forced to arbitrate a dispute, but whether "as
a non-party, it can be compelled to produce documents in the arbitration"
between the employee news anchor and the employer television station.

